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Trinitarian theology: 
Hegelian Vis-Ä-Vis Advaitic 
In order to understand Hegers contribution to the understanding 
of the Trinity properly we have to go back to Plato's arguments 
concerning the absoluteness and inexpressibility bf God. For Plato 
it is impossible to think and express the unity of God, because our 
thinking is limited and determined by the discrimination of subject 
and predicate, which means duality in any case. To express God as 
subject can be done only in a predicative determination. Since the 
realm of the predicate is always wider than the realm of the subject, 
it is impossible to go beyond this contradiction. God is one ( h i n 
e s t i n ) . But in this sentence the " i s " is only copulative and not an 
expression of existence since otherwise the One would participate in 
Being, which presupposes dualism.1 This One { h i n ) does not have any 
name nor can it be known, because it is the subject of any knowledge.,2 
This is the origin of all following t h e o l o g i a n e g a t i v a which has 
come via neoplatonism to many Fathers of the Church such as 
Clement, Origen, the Cappadozian fathers, and especially Dionysius, 
the Areopagite. Due to this line of thinking Plato has played a 
considerable part in the genesis of the doctrine of the Trinity. To 
think the Oneness of God means in the strict sense to think him as 
the One (to h i n ; Sanskrit: t a d e k a n i ) , which is logically impossible, 
because the One Stands above Being as well as above any other quali-
fication. If I want to speak about God I have to think about him as 
the being One ( h i n estin).* This means he partieipates in Being 
1. Plato, Parmenides, 137 c. 
2. Plato, Parmenides, 142 a. 
3. Plato, Parmenides, 142 b Plato iiidicates thedifference in giving the first 
''estin'9 no accent nnd thus indicating the copulative, whereas the second 
*estin , ? bears an accent indicatinjg the ontological Statement. 
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( m e t e t ' h e i ) , which implies duality. Hence the One is not thought. The 
Absolute becomes relative when thought. This means that the 
absoluteness of God means his inexpressibility. Between the first 
hen e s t i n and the second hen e s t i n in Plato there is a similar relation-
ship as between the nirgüna b r a h m a n and t h p s a g u n a b r a h m a n . The 
same problem is at issue. Both Systems of thought have difficulties in 
making the transition from the first to the second position ihtelligible. 
In Advaita Vedänta the undeterminable mäyä is mediating, whereas 
Plato—at least in his Parmenides—puts one position next to the other 
rather abruptly.4 
The Trinitarian notion of God could contribute to a Solution if 
the Trinity could be interpreted non-dualistically. Already the early 
Fathers have said that concerning God neither static attributes nor 
pässions nor affects can be thought because of the absolute unity of 
God. 5 However, it is precisely the Intention of the notion of the 
Trinity to integrale the many into Oneness. The unity of the 
Trinitarian God is not a One which would be abstracted from the 
Many and would lead into dualism, as this cannot be avoided in 
Plato, for example. This would be—according to Hegel—a "bad 
ihfinity", non-unity. The unity of the Trinitarian God is rather an 
infinite power of integration to unify the Many into One without 
being identical or different from the Many ; God is the integration of 
all difference. In his unity it is in infinite relätionships due to his 
power of integration. In this light we have to understand all affir-
mations concerning God. A l l of reality can express God insofar as 
God as the unifying Whole is transparent through it. There is no need 
for a special or specific language or symbolism, but the whole reality 
is in God and can, therefore, express him. But God is infinitely more 
than any symbol or the reality as a whole. The reality is in him, but 
he is not the reality. The spatial part gets its meaning from the 
whole, not vice v i r s a . 
Concerning the unity of the Trinitarian efficacyof God, every 
expression about God is' likewise appropriate or inadequate. This 
includes the via n e g a t i v a as well as the via e m i n e n t i a l and the via 
4. Other sayings (cf. the Diotima Speech) tend towards1 a thediatiöri in a 
total!y different sense. Cf . A . Speiser, Ein Parmenideskommentar, (Leipzig: 
1937),;p.2& 
5. Tertuilian, Advl V o l . 4; Ircnaeüs; Adv. Haer. 1,12,2. : ' f J 
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c a u s a l i t a t i s . The determination' of an expression as being adequate 
or inadequate cannot be made formally on the basis of this expression 
alone. It depends on the context and the attitude ofthe one; who 
makes this expression. In other words, we have to consider the experi-
ential character of our encounter with God. Without going further 
into detail at this point, we can now proceed to analyse Hegers 
doctrine of the Trinity. In his doctrine of the Trinity Hegel takes his 
stand firmly in the classical tradition, though he reinterprets some 
important points. The doctrine of the Trinity is an integral part of 
his System and can be understood properly only in this connection 
We want to clarify only a few points. 
Hegel Starts with his criticism of Kant's dualism. The "Thing 
in itself" remains an abstract "other one" in relation to the world 
of experiences and phenomena. It is for itself. Hence, reality is 
split into two realities which are more or less unrelated.6 At this 
point Hegel mtroduces his Dialectical Logic. It is the Self-expression 
ofthe Absolute before all differentiation into matter and spirit etc. 
Its content is this One, the "true matter".7 The Absoluteis unity 
of Being and Non-Being, that is on the level of reflection the unity of 
identity and non-identity.8 That both Being and Non-Being have to 
be thought as unity means that they cannot be abstracted, that one is 
determined by the other. Thus, there is an essential relationship 
between both determinations: "Truth is neither Being nor Nothing, 
but that Being in Nothing and Nothing in Being—does not pass over-
but has passed over". 9 Both are at the same time absölutely diÖerent 
and inseparablei Each of them disappears into its contrary, änd what 
we can think, is the result of this process. The Absolute is this 
ßecoming. Being ahd Nothing are only the abstract moments of 
Becoming; they are in total relation to each other, identical yet 
6. G . W . F . Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (Vol. I, BerIin:197J), p. 28f. 
7. Hegel, op. cit*, p 31 : **but a matter, which does not have the form as an 
external^because this matter is rather the pure thought, thus the absolute 
form itself. The Logic is therefore the system of pure reason, to be 
comprehended as the realm of pure thought. This realm is the truth as it 
is without veil being in and for itself\ Therefore it can be said that its 
content is the representation of God as he is in his eternal being before the 
creation of na iure and finite spirit/* 
8. Hegel, op. cit., p. 59. 
9. Hegel, op. cit., p. 67. ( » 
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different. To think a difference of Being and Nothing means to apply 
certain determinations which would be relative and not any more 
absolute. In this way neither Being nor Nothing would be thought.10 
To think this unity is the task of Dialectics which is "the higher 
reasonable movement in which such entities, which seem to be totally 
separated, pass over into each other by itself, by what they are thus 
abolishing the precondition of their Separation. It is in the dial-
ectical immanent nattire of Being and Nothing itself, that they show 
their unity, the Becoming as their truth". 1 1 
What Hegel wants to say here becomes even clearer in under-
standing the Contraposition which Hegel himself indicates: Par-
menidös wants to think only Being. Nothing is not. Hence, he puts 
forth a dualism of Being and Nothing which became important for 
the whole later history of Western thinking. The Being is the 
absolute indiscernible One. This Being cannot be determined and it 
cannot act because this would require determination. Therefore 
Being remains empty. It cannot be said how to proceed from this 
beginning; how to think reality under those circumstances. Indeed, 
at least in Plato's Parmenides, you have to overcome this first position 
totally in order to find a new starting point. Yet, this implies a 
certain dualism. If Being is thought as abstract One, all movement 
has to come from outside, from a second, even relative, principle. 
This i s a contradiction in itself.1 2 
Hegel refers here to the same problem which can hardly be solved 
in A d v a i t a Vedänta, according to my undexstanding: How can the 
absolute One (nirguna b r a h m a n ) pass over into its unfoldment or 
display called s a g u n a b r a h m a n ? Even i f we do not speak of a real 
unfoldment but conceive of the difference as illusion superimposed on 
our mind, we have to explain how it is possible that this illusion is 
superimposed. The answer is : it is the creative but veiling power of 
mäyä. But what then is the relationship between the absolute One 
( n i r g u n a b r a h m a n ) and this dynamic principle called mäyä ? Does the 
One remain absolute ? Whatever may be the answer, a relative duality 
cannot be excluded. And this is precisely the point in favour of 
Hegel's argumentation. Becoming and perishing penetrate each other 
10. Hegel, op. cit., p. 77f. 
11. Hegel, op. cit., p . 92. 
12. Hegel, op. cit., p. 80f. 
T r i n i t a r i a n t h e o l o g y : H e g e l i a n vis-ä-vis A d v a i t i c 287 
in the same way as Being and Nothing disappeär in each öther. 
Becoming and perishing are the same. They describe the one process 
which is caused by the relatingof opposites, only each from the other's 
standpoint. Becoming is a shapeless "unrest, which returns into a 
calm result". It is not the Nothing, because in this case there would 
be an opposite of Being, Then "the unity of Being and Nothing would 
become a calm simplicity". 1 3 
Taking into account these considerations Hegel derives his 
contraposition towards Kant: The "Thing in itself" is in the 
appearance. This is an ontological Statement. The Thing in itself 
is the true being of the appearance, it is the infinite iq the finite14 and 
as such not separated from the appearance or the finite, respectively. 
The infinite is the nature of the finite itself, there is nothing outside 
of it, no second. Otherwise the infinite would not have been thought, 
but would be a relativity of dual entities which would make the 
notion of the infinite absurd. The Absolute is not outside the 
appearance but in it as its negative, and v i c e v e r s a . That is why it is 
not simply the appearance, but precisely the negation. Being the 
negation, however, it is its true being, not stränge to the finite, as it 
were.15 If we do think the finite beside the infinite we would always 
imply this certain dualism and get onlya"bad infinity" which would 
mean only a quantitative extension of the finite, remaining in 
relativity. It would be "finite infinity", 1 6 which could transcend the 
relative only relatively. Hegel's point is that we häye to go beyond 
this manner of reflection which remains always in its own circle. 1 7 
If the dualism between infinity and the finite, between God and 
man is not overcome, there cannot be human freedom. Because i f 
God is the all determining reality, and yet he hashis lirnit at the self-
determination of man it would contradict the absoluteriess of God. 
But if the infiniteis recognized, as the true beingöfthe ftnite, if the 
unity of both is established, we could conceive of hürriart freedom as 
the realization of the freedom of God . 1 8 
13. Hegel, op.cit.yp. 93. 
14. Hegel. op.cit.tp. 108; 127ff. 
15. Hegel, op. cit.t p . 127. 
16. Hegel, op. cit., p. 133. 
17 Hegel, op. cit., p. 131. 
18. L . Oeing-Hanhoff. "Hegels Trinitätsfehre" , in Theologie und Philosophie 
52, 3 (Feiburg:1977), p. 384. . 
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It is HegePs intention to overcome thesc dualistic contradictions. 
He tries to solve the problem by means of the Christian Trinitarian 
notion of God as the means for a dialectical coneept of reality. That 
the infinite is in the finite does not mean, that we speak of the power 
ofa Strange presence, but it is inherent in the finite to pass over itself, 
tö transcend itself: this is its infinity.1 9 Hegel sees the true infinity in 
the Becoming of the Trinitarian God where the triplicity produces 
and represents the Single moments of this process. His whole Logic 
is the exhibition of this Becoming which he conceives as the seif-
real ization of God. That is why this process is the revelation of God, 
and the Dialectical Logic is the genuine report of this revelation. 
Logic is the science of revelation.20 The doctrine of the Trinity 
reflects the seJf-representation of God which can be expressed in 
dialectical negations. The whole process of the world actually is the 
revelation of God which has to be seen under three determinations.21 
The First determination is that God is seen in his eternity before 
the creation of the world, Here, God thinks himself, he is 
"unmoved silence." This is the Kingdom of the Father. 
The second determination is that God creates the world and 
hence sets forth Separation and discrimination. God appears in a 
special way. He negates his being in and for himself (An-und-für-
s i c h - S e i n ) and goes into appearance, which would be an illusion i f 
thought as something beside God. The above-mentioned dialectics of 
infinity and finite becomes useful here upto the radicality of the death 
of God. (Because the once put difference has to be abolished again 
in the negation of negation.)22 This is the reconciliation of the 
19. Hegel, op. cit., p . 135: " T h e finite is not negated by the infinite as an 
external power, but it is its infinity to negate itself." 
20. Hegel, op. cit., pp. 133, 142. With this argumentation Hegel refers to some 
examplcs in the Christian tradition. EspeciaJIy Seotus Eriugcna thinks 
God as the infinite one who mediates the finite with himself in the Trinita-
rian process. Cf. F . Chr. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit 
and Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Vol. II, 
Tübingen: 1842), p. 293f. 
21. Cf . Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (Lassön) Vol . II. 
Die absolute Religion, Hamburg 1966, p. 30f. 
22. E . Jnngeh Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (Tübingen: 1977), p. I23f.says: It is 
. Hegers, special.cpntTibution t,o^  deyelop the "theology of the crueified one 
as a doctrine of the triune G o d " phüosophically. • . j > 
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infinite with the finite in unity. This second determination is the 
kingdom of the Son, ' . > 
The third determination is the result of the negation of the. 
particularity, Thus, what has appeared historically, particularly 
in the second determination is negated into the Spirit of the corn^ 
munity. The special reconciliation is negated into the general or 
universal as the determination of negation of negation. Thisisth* 
kingdom of the Spirit 
God is Spirit, which is in the continuous movements of its Coming, 
to itself. And "God as Spirit is essentially this : to be for another, 
to reveal itself; he does not create the world once, but is the eternal 
creator, the eternal revealing. This is he the pure a c t u s ; this is his 
notion, his determination".2 3 Creation, redemption etc. are 
moments of this one process of self-revelation in the same way as the. 
three persons of the Trinity are determinations of the one process of 
the "self-creation" of God, who reveals himself in this process as. 
Spirit. God as Spirit is the precondition for this process, but being. 
Spirit he is also and at the same time the result, insofar as in the 
third determination he has integrated the infinity arid the finite, Or, 
as Hegel says elsewhere : "He rs the subject of the movement and he: 
is also the movement itself '\ 2 4 ' 
God is the event in which he completes himself, that is, Trini-
tarian life. And he is at the same time the subject of this event. This 
is the meaning of the doctrine of the unity of the Trinity* which is 
also an event differentiated threefold in its particular mqments. This; 
is also the way to mediate the infinite and the finite without going 
into dualistic differentiations. Hegel finds the first example for this 
Trinitarian reality in self-consciousness, which is as being-reflected-
in-itself result-of a process, in which the above explained Trinitarian 
notions are immanent'25 
God is Spirit, and as such the subject of the process in which he 
produces himself. This means ; he ispersonality.-6 Personality here 
ctoes not mean an individual centre and as such-a separated entity. 
23. Hegel, op. cit., p. 35. -
24. Hegel, Phänomenologie lies Geistes (Hoffmeister) {Leipzig; 1949), p. 546f. 
25. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I; pV 148. -
26. Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, op. eh., p. 57. 
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Personality is rather absolute subjectivity in Paul Tiilich's terms—a 
centre of freedom having power over itself. Person is relationship. 
The personality of God is his perfect interrelatedness. There is no 
Separation between God and the world but interrelation and intcr-
penetration between them. However, since God is not dependent at 
all, he is the centre for all interrelation. He determines interrelated-
ness. This means he i s freedom. 
As subject reflected in itself, of which single moments are the 
three Trinitarian "persons", he is only one personality. In the dis-
crimination ofthe Father and the Son and the interchange of both we 
have love. 2 7 That is why only the Trinity as a whole can be personality. 
The notion öf personality corresponds with the notion of freedom. 
Büt only God as the result mediated with itself is freedom, not the 
single moments of this dialectical process.20 Because of the rational 
unity of the Trinitarian notion God can be thought as self-discrimina-
ting yet identical with himself. This relationship marks the identity 
of the divine history. God as Trinitarian history has to be seen in its 
three förms. 2 9 
First, God is "the eternal being in and with himself", he is being 
in and for himself, not yet realized in appearance. Concerning our 
spatial understanding, this means that he is beyond, apart from the 
world of finite beings. Concerning our temporal understanding, this 
means that he is beyond time "as, eternal idea in the dement of the 
pure thought of eternity." He is God the Father. Second, God is the 
form of appearance, the particularity, the being for others. Hence. 
he is related, understandable and actual. He is historical being, 
spatially under historical circumstances and temporaUy under the 
modifications of past, present and future. He is God the Son. Third, 
God is the form of return from appearance towards himself. He is 
God as subject ofthe process, which is present in the finite appearance. 
namely, in the human consciousness of the congregation. Hc is 
present as present reality which tends towards perfection in the future. 
He is God the Spirit. 
God is actuality ip determining himself, becoming actuai and 
dying to this actualization again in order to delimit the appearance of 
27. Hegel, op. cit., p. 57f. 
28. Hegel, op. cit., p. 61: "Personality is freedom," 
29. Hegel, op. cit., p. 65f. 
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himself into Spiritual universality. Hegel responds to this in the 
Phenomenology: "The death of the mediator taken up by the Seif is 
the negation of his objectivity or his spatial being for himself; this 
particular being for himself has become universal self-conscious-
ness." 3 0 This is the old idea of the t h e o p o i o s i s of man in the form of 
dialectical logic! 
No doubt. Hegel conceives of the Trinitarian notion in relation 
with the revelation which is actual in Jesus Christ. But only in this 
argument as described here does revelation make sense for Hegel: 
"The reconciliation in Christ which is believed does not make sense 
without God being the triune God: that he is, but also as the other is, 
as the self-discriminating one, so that this other is God himself, has 
the divine nature in itself, and that this negation of the difference, the 
being other, that this return of love is the Spirit. This understanding 
means that faith is not a relationship towards something subordinate, 
but towards God himself." 3 1 
The Trinitarian God is Spirit. Both the origin as well as the 
result (the determination of the third "person") are called Spirit. 
The Third is the first and the first is the third, because the process of 
the divine life is not external but internal. It is "nothing other than 
the play of self-preservation, of making sure of itself," 3 2 The result 
of the inner-trinitarian process is, that God attains self-consciousness 
by means of his history. The world history which we can observe is 
nothing eise than the external aspect of this inner-trinitarian process. 
These are some of the basic points of Hegers doctrine of the 
Trinity. Four problems seem to be of special interest with regard to 
our topic: 
I. The doctrine of the Trinity is for Hegel a possibüity to over-
come ontological dualism. The Absolute, that is, God as Spirit, is 
the One Reality which is displayed in a three fold self-movement, 
Coming to itself. First, God is pure substance or content of his own 
30. Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 545f. 
31. Hege!, Philosophie der Religion, p. )73f. The last sentence shows agatn, 
that faith in Christ requires the Trinitarian understanding of God because 
of soteriological reasons. Cf. Jüngel, op. cit., p. 73. 
32. Hege), op. eil., p . 73. 
292 M i c h a e l von Brück 
consciousness, then he passes over into the becoming other, that is, 
into a synthesis with limited determinations which he sets forth from 
himself. He incarnates himself as limited human being in order to 
return into the Spiritual unity of self-consciousness. Hegel illustrates 
these moments as each a perfect circle, and that is why God is perfect 
even in each moment, for "his extensive movement is therefore this, 
to display in each of his moments as elements his nature." 3 3 
In the terminology of A d v a i t a Vedänta this could mean: The 
eternal self-movement of the Absolute ( b r a h m a n ) goes through the 
moments of n i r g u n a b r a h m a n a n d s a g u n a b r a h m a n in order to know 
itself in a third mediated sta'te in order to negate the objectivity of the 
s a g u n a b r a h m a n into pure sübjectivity of the Whole which is reflected 
in itself but now perfectly as rest. This third Step is sighificantly 
enough, not known to Advaita Vedänta, and it would be also hardly 
possible tö speak of a "self-movement" of b r a h m a n , since these appea-
rances are due to mäyä. Therefore, they cannot be conceived of as 
history of the Absolute. But for Hegel, the Absolute is subject, which 
is self-movement, whereas the n i r g u n a b r a h m a n in Hegel's sense would 
be substance, which rests in itself and is always for itself. 3 4 
However, there are sufficient indications that in A d v a i t a Vedänta 
the Absolute could be regarded as subject in Hegel's sense, namely, 
when the Absolute is sat (Being) which is at the same time c i t (pure 
consciousness) and-in this reflection in itself - ähanda (bliss). Yet, as 
far as Ican see, these self-expressions of the Absolute are not meant to 
be taken with regard to the relationship of the n i r g u n a and s a g u n a 
b r a h m a n . 
2. For Hegel the Trinitarian history is real and ontologicaüy 
valid. Thus, the negation of dualism in world history is also a real 
process for Hegel. The differences are regarded as alredy.come away 
with. The question is whether this view is verifiable and in accordance 
with our real historicaL Situation. The Left-Hegelians have denied 
this, and they started in fact to do away the differences because in 
view of our real experience "the moment of difference. . . cannot be 
extinguished without making reconciliation a cynical-reactionary 
33. Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 533. 
34. Hegel, op. cit., p. 19f. 
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slogan." 3 5 lndeed, Hegel thinks reality as history, but he does not 
think the real history. And that is the reason why the dualism which 
Hegel wanted to overcome is brought in again at the existential level. 
A d v a i t a Vedänta does not identify God with his self-realization in 
revelation. Both are non-dual ( a d v a i t a ) , but they are aspects of our 
understanding. Our understanding depends on the degree of realiza-
tion of the Spirit or Seif. We are not perfect, so according to A d v a i t a 
Vedänta, perfection can be expected without Splitting reality dualisti-
cally. Perfection or non-perfection are not a matter of ontological 
but of gnoseological (or psychological) considerations. This is defi-
nitely an impressive view. Yet, this demands our acceptance that the 
self-movement of God or creation is not real in the ontological sense 
of the term. Hegel's idea, that this self-movement of God be a play 
of love with itself, qould be understood as mäyä. Yet, in Advaita 
Vedänta it is precisely only the play of mäyä as distinct from the 
unmoved Öne, For Hegel,, it is important to note that movement is 
achieved by the^on-going negation of one moment into the other.36 
Therefore, the process of God is a, change into the "death of God" , 
which, indeed, is the end of an "empty beyond" and indicates defini-
tely the end of any dualistip metaphysicsas the result of the history of 
G o d . 3 7 This last argurr^ent is impossible for A d v a i t a Vedänta. For 
Hegel, non-du{alism is the result of a real process, in Christian terms: 
non-di^alism is the eschatological result of the history of God in its 
Trinitarian process. For A d v a i t a Vedänta non-dualism is .the experi-
ence of the true nature of reality which is, ha§ been and will be. It 
is achieved when the veil of our dualistic understanding is removed 
by the a d v a i t i c experience. 1 
3. In Hegel's approach there is a tendency to think God not as 
Trinity, but in a binitarian way. Hegel thinks about the relationship 
of Father and Son as being one in the other, this means in terms of 
the Greek perichöresis. The Spirit is the union of both in love, but 
35. P. Cornehl, D i e Z u k u n f t der Versöhnung. Esehatologie und E m a n z i p a t i o n 
i n der Aufklärung, bei H e g e l und i n der Hegeischen Schule (Götfingen. 1971), 
p. 356f. 
36 C . F. V . Weizsäcker, " Z u Hegels D i a l e k t i k " , in D e r G a r t e n des M e n s c h l i -
chen* Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Anthropologie (München: 1977), p. 356f. 
37. M . Heidegger, Nietzsches W o r t ''Gott ist tot", in Holzwege (Frankfurt: 
a . M . 1963), p. 200. 
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this does not constitute really the third "person" of the Trinity, but 
only the relationality of Father and Son. 3 8 Because Hegel under-
stands the whole Trinitarian Becoming as Spirit, he cannot think the 
third moment as "person" in the same sense as the first (Father) and 
the second (Son). This, however, has tremendous consequences for 
the understanding of the freedom of God. In order to be able to 
think the ability for decision in God, we have to discriminate between 
divine knowledge and divine will . And precisely this was done by 
scholastic theology by means of the doctrine of the Trinity. 3 9 Only if 
a priority of the known over the wanted is established in God, the 
realization of creation canbe understood asfree choice among various 
other known possibilities. Where the discrimination of knowledge 
and will in God is not made, creation could not be understood as a 
free act of God, because freedom iricludes choice. God's freedom 
would be inferior to human freedom, that is the notion of freedom 
would not make sense with regard to God. Hegel's philosophy can 
be interpreted in such a way, that at least it views this problem as not 
süfficiently solved. The reason is that unity and threefold differenti-
ation in God are not balanced süfficiently.40 
4. On the other hand, "revelation of the Trinitarian life of God 
is the essential condition for the possibility of füll human freedom".41 
Because human freedom means that man surrenders himself into the 
öbjective event of the Spirit and is determined by it, the particular 
existence is negated into the universality ofthe Spirit. Thus, human 
freedom as participation in the freedom of the Trinitarian God, which 
is mediated, which itself becomes a possible experience. Therefore, 
the individual gains infinite dignity, because it is negated in God. It 
is a moment of the process of the self-realization of God. Human 
freedom would be the appearance of the infinite in the finite. And 
this means«—in view of the priniciples of Dialectical Logic—-that any 
dualism or any mutual limitation of human and divine freedom is 
transcended. Divine freedom realizes itself in the Trinitarian Becom-
ing, and human freedom is the realization of divine freedom under 
the aspect ofthe limited and finite existence. But the act of freedom 
as such is already the negation of the finite, the return from the parti-
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cular in to the infinity or universality of God : human freedom is the 
expression as well as the form of realization of God who is Spirit. 
Man is not God. But man is one moment in the self-realization 
of God. Man is relative to God, but in his individuality he is of 
infinite dignity, because in him the freedom of God determines itself. 
For Hegel, we can summarize now, God and man are neither identical 
nor different. Indeed, they are not—two, a d v a i t a . 
The basic difference between Hegel and A d v a i t a Vedänta is. That 
in A d v a i t a Vedänta the individuality cannot be understood as an 
essential moment of God. Man, who has realized the ätman as the 
true nature of his being and has returned non-dualistically into God, 
did not undergoa real process nor did he realize himself participating 
in a greater and more comprehensive process. He has transcended 
only the illusion of individuality. That is why in A d v a i t a Vedänta 
human freedom cannot beapolarity for the freedom of God, dialecti-
cally mediated. Human freedom becomes real only, when it is 
totally one with the freedom of God, regardless of all individual and 
finite particularities. This understanding makes freedom a fact and 
guarantees, finally, the freedom of choice. 
